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Insanity or Part of a Plan?  
Prospects for Changes  
to North Korean Domestic and Foreign Policy 
Nicolas Levi1 
Ever since previous North Korean leader Kim Jong-il passed away in December 2011, concerns about 
the new North Korean regime have been growing. Although the international community has worried 
mainly about the country’s foreign policy, especially nuclear and missile threats, recent news about  
a purge in the North Korean leadership has brought to the fore the question of the regime’s internal 
stability. Kim Jong-un has been steadily building a new system of governance, giving more power to the 
Korean Workers’ Party apparatus at the expense of the armed forces. He has also shown interest in 
boosting North Korea’s economy. In foreign and security policy, however, in the short term, North 
Korea is likely to continue on its previous uncompromising course.  
For the North Korean leadership, which above all is interested in keeping its privileges and avoiding any 
kind of instability within the Korean Peninsula, political and economic issues are at the top of the agenda. 
This overarching goal is clearly discernible in the changes that have taken place in North Korea since the 
rise of Kim Jong-un in September 2010, in particular in the process of building the mechanisms for 
guaranteeing the perpetuation of the political system in North Korea.  
The country has probably begun an era of building a new kind of governance mechanism that is managed 
jointly by Kim Jong-un and his advisors. This new trend has been manifesting itself through the activities of 
the institutions playing pivotal roles in establishing, cementing and formatting domestic and foreign policy of 
the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). Some North Korea watchers assert that military 
institutions will naturally play a central role in building a strong country and will be promoted by the new 
North Korean leader. Yet, the military institutions are now partially under the control of the civilian 
officials. The command centres of the North Korean regime are now many, including some of the 
departments of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee (KWP CC), the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) of the KWP, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the personal secretariat of Kim Jong-
un and other organisations directly attached to these four. The reorganisation of the political system has to 
be seen in the context of the goals set up by the North Korean government within the Kangsong Taeguk  
(“a strong and prosperous country”) policy. The recent ousting and execution of Jang Sung Thaek, Kim 
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Jong-un’s powerful uncle, may complicate readings of North Korean policymaking, but most probably will 
not change the general policy direction of the DPRK.  
Change of Power within the North Korean System 
It can be noted that Kim Jong-un, especially since the death of his father, has been emphasising the role of 
the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), not only regarding internal matters but also regarding external ones. 
Before the nomination of Kim Jong-un, the military was a crucial tool for overcoming internal difficulties. 
North Korea first faced a political and economic crisis in the 1990s, when the Cold War structures were 
dismantled and the DPRK suffered from global isolation. Regime change and implosion in some of its key 
allies (such as the Soviet Union and other communist bloc countries) meant that North Korea could no 
longer rely on its traditional partners, including in the military field. This situation drove North Korea into  
a strategy that put an emphasis on survival rather than the promotion of unification or cooperation with 
South Korea. Since then, the DPRK seems to be successful mostly in threatening the peace within the 
Korean Peninsula and East Asia, which underlines the role of the military.  
The “military-first” policy, first promulgated by Kim Jong-il in a speech made in November 1996, is still at 
the centre of internal policy of the DPRK.2 However, due to a better internal situation (improvement of 
the economic situation, increased exports), the role of the KPA could be decreased over the last few years. 
Since the mid-1990s, the military units had been committed to the management of various economic 
entities (cooperative farms, construction of public infrastructure, guarding of crops), but these activities 
seem to be in decline as party officials take control over the army. For example, Pak Pong-ju, the current 
prime minister of the DPRK, was the factory manager of the February 8 Vinylon Factory Complex in 
Hungnam, an entity managed by the KPA until the 1990s but which was later taken over by the civilian 
authorities.  
It is also noteworthy that the DPRK is no longer conducting activities to propagate the military-first policy 
on the domestic scene. The regime’s propagandists are still promulgating claim that the KPA is the 
strongest army in the world, but now they emphasise that the KPA is the Army of the Party. This means that 
the army is subordinated to the KWP. In fact, the military policy of the DPRK is now under the control of 
civilian officials such as Kim Kyong-ok (deputy director of the KWP Organisation and Guidance 
Department), Pak To-chun (member of the KWP National Defence Commission) and Ju Kyu-jang (member 
of the KWP National Defence Commission and director of the Machine-Building Industry Department).  
A strong party organisation within the KPA is the Second Economy Committee (a kind of KPA ministry for 
economic matters) managed by Paek Sae-bong. The military-first policy is then managed by civilian officials. 
The decreasing role of the KPA should be also put in parallel with the creation of new special economic 
zones,3 the development of tourist projects and the rise in contacts with foreign partners.  
The decrease of the role of the military should not be overestimated. The DPRK is still placing high 
importance on the strengthening of its military. Since coming to power, Kim Jong-un has been frequently 
seen engaging in official functions related to military affairs. He has been regularly visiting military units or 
installations erected by the soldiers. In fact, military-related activities were top among Kim’s public 
appearances during the first half of 2013.4    
Party Organisation 
The institution that plays the most important role in developing the internal policy of North Korea is sure 
to be the KWP Central Committee. Three offices are particularly important: the Organisation and 
Guidance Department, the Administration Department and the Propaganda and Agitation Department.  
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The most important organisation within the KWP is the Organisation and Guidance Department, is 
arguably the most important player in the Central Committee. This section of the KWP is responsible for 
supervising party affairs and the internal policy of North Korea. It  may be associated with the personal 
secretariat of Kim Jong-un, a structure composed of advisors to Kim Jong-un who decide the future policies 
of North Korea.  
Regarding the Administration Department, this organisation was managed by Jang Sung Thaek, the uncle of 
Kim Jong-un, from 2007 until his 2013 purge. It is responsible for the appointment of new party leaders and 
for the development of cities. This entity is also managing some companies subordinate to the NDC 
(National Defence Commission). Finally, the Propaganda and Agitation Department is an organ tasked with 
ideological matters. It is the guardian of the North Korean system in terms of ideological purity, and is 
managed by Kim Ki-nam and Choe Ik-kyu, advisors of the Kim family.  
The recent rise of non-military figures has led North Korea watchers harbour the view that the country’s 
military is under the control of the party and is no longer top of the structure of power. Important details 
serve as confirmation of this new hierarchy. Up until the mid-2000s, the North Korean VIPs seated on the 
main platform during public events had been listed in the order of the importance of their functions in the 
military structures of the DPRK, and not their membership in various party organisations. Since the late 
2000s, however, VIP names have been quoted according to a new classification, starting with the members 
of the Central Military Commission (an organisation subordinated to the KWP), followed by the deputy 
premiers (heads of departments in the KWP CC), and only afterwards listing the officials of the KPA.  
Consequences for Some Aspects of DPRK Economic Policy 
When Kim Jong-un assumed power, the characteristics of North Korea’s economic strategy showed the 
desire to restore its traditional economic model, characterised by a strong role for the party within 
economic entities. According to financial data, the North Korean economy began to recover in 1999 after  
a huge slump in the 1990s.5 Its foreign trade has also dramatically increased. North Korean trade, which 
totalled $2.4 billion in 2000, reached $5.6 billion in 2008. Inter-Korean trade jumped, respectively, from 
$425 million to $1.8 billion in 2008. The increase in exports of natural raw materials contributed to the 
improvement of the country’s economic situation.  
The increased role of civilians in the economic management of the DPRK may have an influence on the 
choice of investment and trade partners. Since 2000, China has been rapidly investing in the DPRK. The 
Chinese government has been very active in encouraging its enterprises to engage in various forms of 
cooperation with North Korea. The Chinese presence increased when North Korea took radical measures 
to improve its economy in 2002, establishing a stricter accounting plan for its companies and shifting to  
a profit model, which allows companies to keep part of their profit. The development of mining in North 
Korea also constituted an opportunity for Chinese companies, as Chinese investors are especially 
interested in the development of mineral resources. Chinese investments include joint ventures focused on 
the distribution of agribusiness products and fisheries activities. The internal market of basic goods is also 
dominated by Chinese products. Notably, Pyongyang First Department Store, the biggest shop in the 
capital, is also co-managed by North Korea and China. As North Korea still lacks foreign currencies, most 
of the deals between both countries are conducted under the form of barters or joint ventures. In addition 
to the business relationship, the official aid from China to North Korea is close to $10 million.6 China is 
also helping North Korea by providing food (grain) and raw materials unavailable in North Korea.  
The leadership realises that North Korea’s reliance on China will be affected by its relations with other 
countries. Despite the centrality of its relationship with Beijing, North Korea is now pursuing an active 
policy of opening with countries that are competitors to China, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and selected 
European states. For these countries, the nuclear question is not decisive in affecting their relations with 
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North Korea. In the context of the DPRK’s search for other partners, a potential dispute between North 
Korea and China may emerge in the future. A decrease in trade between the DPRK and China in the next 
few years may indicate a willingness to change the economic relationship between China and North Korea. 
China has already recognised the new dynamics and is currently trying to focus its projects in the north-
eastern part of the country, giving priority to the construction of infrastructure in the border area between 
the two states.  
The main goal of the Chinese strategy now is to take over the strategic assets of the North Korean 
economy. With this in mind, the KWP leadership wants first of all to increase domestic control over the 
energy sector (e.g., the mines of Anju, the Vinylon complex), as well as machine-building and metallurgical 
plants. In addition, the leaders of the KWP realise that the wide presence of Chinese capital in the North 
Korean economy may result in a loss of political control over the state. Therefore, Kim Jong-un and his 
advisors want to reduce their dependence on China by diversifying the DPRK’s pool of business partners, 
for example, through the establishment of 14 new, special economic zones open to foreigners.7 
The increased presence of civilian officials in the economic structures of the DPRK can serve the purpose 
of attracting more foreign investment to North Korea, as foreign investors may be more willing to rely on 
civilian officials than on the military. The profile of investments in the country may also change as a result of 
the de-militarisation of the economy. For example, North Korea is developing various tourist projects 
similar to those initiated by South Korea for visitors to the North.8 As of today, North Korea has shown 
progress in developing its tourist infrastructure: major projects were launched, such as the erection of the 
Masik complex dedicated to winter sports.9 North Korea is also promoting an international golf 
tournament.10  
The execution of Jang Sung Thaek may affect the fate of the industrial park in the border town of Kaesong. 
This industrial complex launched activities in 2004. In total, 116 South Korean companies were operating in 
the zone, employing more than 40,000 North Koreans. Seoul hopes to continue the operations in Kaesong. 
However, due to the fact that this zone was under the control of Jang Sung Thaek’s relatives, it may be 
under threat.  
Consequences on the Foreign Policy of the DPRK 
North Korea set 2012 as a key year in order to become Kangsong Taeguk. However, it failed to become  
“a strong and prosperous country,” since paradoxically it is largely dependent on the DPRK’s relations with 
outside countries. North Korea’s fundamental foreign policy challenge has to be seen in the framework of 
managing relations with its two most important regional neighbours—China and the Russian Federation. 
Since these countries are much more powerful than North Korea, DPRK’s strategic goal has been to keep 
its neighbours divided and to avoid the emergence of a single hegemonic neighbour.  
Recognising the imbalance of power between the DPRK and these neighbours is fundamental to 
understanding North Korea’s nuclear strategy. Due to the suspension of military and economic assistance 
to North Korea in the 1990s, Pyongyang had to develop its own strategy of survival, and chose to focus on 
the development of its nuclear programme.11 Therefore, it is rather difficult to expect the DPRK to 
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definitively close its nuclear weapons programme, even if some North Korean nuclear facilities may be 
disabled as part of an agreement with outside powers. 
A shift of power from the KPA to the KWP may lead to a softer position of the North Korean leadership 
regarding the nuclear issue. China certainly wants to avoid an escalation of the crisis around North Korea, 
fearing miscalculation and the outbreak of a conflict. Still, despite its influence over the DPRK, China has so 
far failed to persuade it to cease its nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment. It can also be expected 
that North Korea will continue its nuclear advances to obtain the international recognition of its status as  
a nuclear weapons power and create favourable conditions for potential negotiations directly with the 
United States.  
The recent events related to the ousting and execution of Jang Sung Thaek, who was effectively the number 
two man in the DPRK, may worsen the chances for a positive change in North Korea’s foreign policy.12 The 
execution of Kim Jong-un’s uncle was supposedly urged on by elements within the military that are 
opposed to the liberalisation of the North Korean economy. For them, reinforcing the confrontation with 
the United States may lead to a reinforcement of their own power and be the preferred path to a “strong” 
country. The prospect of potential instability inside North Korea has to be taken as a grave threat to the 
security of South Korea. Therefore, the commitment of the United States to the security of the South may 
increase within the next months, and a closer South Korean–U.S. cooperation can be envisaged under the 
form of joint military exercises.  
Conclusions  
At this point, North Korea’s political system is not likely going to change as the Kim family has a tight grip 
on power and is expected to continue its policies. As Kim Jong-un is reducing his emphasis on the military 
role, this is a strong indication that the DPRK is changing its internal policy and that the leader is confident 
of his ability to overcome the current crises. When Kim Jong-un is highlighting the role of the military, it is 
not because his power base is not strong enough, but rather because the KPA constitutes an important 
tool for shaping the policy of the DPRK.  
Capitalising on the changes within the North Korean governance system to achieve a stable Korean 
Peninsula would require a number of policy adjustments from all of the major players. First, if the 
Pyongyang regime aims to increase its stability, and if the leadership wants to obtain guarantees regarding 
its security, direct cooperation with the United States is a necessity. Second, South Korea should recognise 
officially the regime of Pyongyang and develop an engagement policy at a higher level than in the past, when 
the North Korean file was managed by officials from the South’s Ministry of Unification. Third, North 
Korea should continue to open its economy, not only to potential South Korean investors but also to 
other countries. This would imply the maintenance of a stable and friendly investment environment within 
the DPRK, and putting an end to the discriminative perceptions of outsiders.13 This could be improved with 
the nomination of new party officials and technocrats to leadership positions within North Korea.  
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